IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/perwir/v8y2007i4p389-397.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Anreize für Weitsicht und Wiederwahlschwellen: Wege zur besseren Demokratie

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Gersbach

Abstract

Although they would promote the common welfare, many political projects are never implemented in democracies. In our article, we make two proposals – incentives for far‐sighted policy and reelection thresholds – that could alleviate this problem and enhance any liberal democracy's efficiency without endangering its founding values.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach, 2007. "Anreize für Weitsicht und Wiederwahlschwellen: Wege zur besseren Demokratie," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(4), pages 389-397, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:8:y:2007:i:4:p:389-397
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2007.00258.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2516.2007.00258.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-2516.2007.00258.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joel Watson, 2007. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 55-81, January.
    2. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, December.
    3. Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008. "Reelection threshold contracts in politics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August.
    4. Hans Gersbach & Markus Müller, 2006. "Elections, Contracts and Markets," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 06/56, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    5. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    6. Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2008. "Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 401-411, November.
    7. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2000. "The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198293323, Decembrie.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gersbach Hans, 2012. "Contractual Democracy," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 823-851, December.
    2. Hans Gersbach & Markus Müller, 2011. "Information Markets, Elections and Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3327, CESifo.
    3. Johannes Gerd Becker & Hans Gersbach, 2013. "A Theory of Threshold Contracts," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 13/182, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    4. Robert Evans, 2008. "Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 459-491, May.
    5. Joel Watson & David A. Miller & Trond E. Olsen, 2020. "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(7), pages 2153-2197, July.
    6. Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008. "Reelection threshold contracts in politics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August.
    7. Markus Müller, 2009. "Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/114, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    8. Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 157-177, October.
    9. Gersbach, Hans & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2017. "Threshold Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 11766, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Markus Müller, 2007. "Motivation of politicians and long-term policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 273-289, September.
    11. Adam, Antonis & Moutos, Thomas, 2011. "A politico-economic analysis of minimum wages and wage subsidies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 171-173, March.
    12. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2020. "Benefits to the majority from universal service," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(2), pages 391-408, April.
    13. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
    14. Eilat, Ran & Paunzer, Ady, 2008. "Optimal Bilateral Trade of Multiple Objects," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275716, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    15. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    16. McCloskey, Deirdre Nansen, 2009. "The Institution of Douglass North," MPRA Paper 21768, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
    18. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "Why are European Countries Diverging in their Unemployment Experience?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 49-68, Fall.
    19. Schottmuller, C. & Boone, J., 2012. "Stochastic Mechanisms and Quasi-Linear Preferences," Discussion Paper 2012-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    20. Kirathimo Muruga & Tatjana Vasiljeva, 2021. "Physicians' Dual Practice: A Theoretical Approach," Central European Business Review, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2021(5), pages 1-20.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:8:y:2007:i:4:p:389-397. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.