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Accountability and Grand Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Cesar Martinelli

Abstract

We propose a model of political careers and electoral accountability in an environment in which politicians may take bribes at different stages of their careers and in which politicians' actions are only imperfectly observed by voters. We show that the expectation of promotion to higher office may motivate some politicians to behave worse at the latest stages of their careers, setting off a trade-off between providing incentives for good behavior at lower levels of office and selecting better politicians for higher office. Optimal rewards focus either on stamping out corruption at lower levels of office or on improving selection for higher office.

Suggested Citation

  • Cesar Martinelli, 2022. "Accountability and Grand Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 645-679, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:645-79
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200186
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    Cited by:

    1. Desiree A. Desierto, 2023. "Corruption for competence," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 399-420, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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