Does Compulsory Voting Help Equalize Incomes?
This paper explores the link between compulsory voting and income distribution using a cross-section of countries around the world. Our empirical cross-country analysis for 91 countries during the period 1960-2000 shows that when compulsory voting can be strongly enforced the distribution of income improves as measured by the Gini coefficient and the bottom income quintiles of the population. Our findings are robust to changes and additions to our benchmark specification. Because poorer countries are the ones with relatively more unequal distribution of income it might make sense to promote such voting schemes in developing regions, such as Latin America. This, under the assumption that bureaucratic costs related with design and implementation are not excessive. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 20 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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