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Votación obligatoria y desigualdad del ingreso en una muestra representativa de países

  • Alberto Chong

    ()

  • Mauricio Olivera

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza la vinculación entre la votación obligatoria y la distribución del ingreso en una muestra representativa de países de todo el mundo. Nuestro análisis empírico de un grupo representativo de 91 países durante el período de 1960 a 2000 muestra que la votación obligatoria, cuando se hace cumplir estrictamente, mejora la distribución del ingreso según el coeficiente Gini y los ingresos del quintil más bajo de la población. Nuestros hallazgos son valederos ante cambios y adiciones a nuestra base comparativa especificada. Dado que los países más pobres sufren de una desigualdad del ingreso relativamente mayor, puede tener sentido fomentar tales mecanismos de votación en regiones en desarrollo como América Latina. En esta propuesta se supone que los costos burocráticos del diseño y la puesta en práctica de dichos mecanismos no son prohibitivos.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4414.

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Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4414
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