Compulsory Voting And Government Spending
In a recent issue of Economics and Politics Crain and Leonard (1993) described the effects of compulsory voting on government spending. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, problems in Crain and Leonard's approach are identified. Their use of the median-voter model appears inconsistent and their choice of government consumption rather than government expenditure is questionable. Second, this paper begins an analysis of the composition of government expenditure. Cross-country data tentatively suggests that non-voters benefit relative to voters from government expenditure on health, housing and transfer payments while voters benefit from government expenditure on defense and economic services.
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pranab Bardhan & John E. Roemer, 1992.
"Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 101-116, Summer.
- Pranab Bardhan and John E. Roemer., 1991. "Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation," Economics Working Papers 91-175, University of California at Berkeley.
- W. Mark Crain & Mary L. Leonard, 1993. "The Right Versus The Obligation To Vote: Effects On Cross-Country Government Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 43-51, 03. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)