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The Political Economy of Redistribution and (In)efficiency in Latin America and The Caribbean

Author

Listed:
  • Matías Güizzo Altube

    (Inter-American Development Bank)

  • Carlos Scartascini

    (Inter-American Development Bank)

  • Mariano Tommasi

    (Universidad de San Andrés)

Abstract

Inequality is a crucial issue in Latin America and the Caribbean, alongside very low productivity gains over the last 60 years and low levels of investment and efficiency. Most literature, especially on the political economy determinants of these problems, has considered these issues individually. This article revisits the discussion on the political economy of redistribution (or lack thereof) in the region, embedding it in a broader political economy debate. We characterize the region and its countries in terms of the size of the public sector, the extent of fiscal redistribution, and the efficiency of public action. We summarize various strands of literature that explain elements of the fiscal vector individually and provide a framework that combines elements from several strands, explaining why different countries exhibit different configurations of government size, redistribution, and efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Matías Güizzo Altube & Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2023. "The Political Economy of Redistribution and (In)efficiency in Latin America and The Caribbean," Working Papers 169, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:sad:wpaper:169
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inequality; Redistribution; Political Economy; Growth; Poverty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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