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Online Appendix: Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness

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  • Daron Acemoglu

    ()

  • James A. Robinson

    ()

  • Ragnar Torvik

    ()

Abstract

In this online appendix we extend the basic model in the paper in several directions, discuss the robustness of the results, and moreover what new mechanisms our extensions implies as compared to the ones in the basic model.

Suggested Citation

  • Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2013. "Online Appendix: Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness," Working Papers No 2/2013, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:bny:wpaper:0011
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    File URL: https://www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/camp/working-papers/2013/working_camp_2-2013.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Xavier Debrun & Tidiane Kinda, 2017. "Strengthening Post‐Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise – A New Dataset," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 38, pages 667-700, December.

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