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Determinants of Presidential Veto in Semi-presidential System: Empirical Insights from Poland

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  • Anna Lewczuk

Abstract

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants influencing the use of presidential vetoes in Poland, with a particular focus on the role of the anti-pluralist attitude of government and intra-executive identity differences, i.e. how different the president’s political views are from the views of the prime minister. We propose an empirical framework to investigate the significant determinants impacting the probability of veto usage. Our paper is based on the theoretical and empirical framework introduced by Köker (2017). The dataset comprises 319 monthly observations spanning from October 1997 to July 2024. The empirical results emphasize the role of cohabitation and ideological differences between the president and the governing party. We argue that these findings contribute to the discourse on the effectiveness of the presidential veto as a mechanism of checks and balances, highlighting that veto decisions may result from various pressures related not only to the individual characteristics of the president or the content of the bill, but also to the current political landscape.

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  • Anna Lewczuk, 2025. "Determinants of Presidential Veto in Semi-presidential System: Empirical Insights from Poland," Ekonomista, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, issue 1, pages 130-150.
    • Handle: RePEc:aoq:ekonom:y:2025:i:1:p:130-150
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(3), pages 845-875.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2013. "Online Appendix: Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness," Working Papers No 2/2013, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
    3. Ragnar Torvik & Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness," Working Paper Series 14013, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other

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