Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?
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- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2011. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000287, David K. Levine.
- Ragnar Torvik & Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2011. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Working Paper Series 11711, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Working Papers No 1/2013, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
- Ragnar Torvik & Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Working Paper Series 13913, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2011. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," NBER Working Papers 17293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- Paradoxes of democracy in LA
by UDADISI in UDADISI on 2013-02-16 08:01:00
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"Populism and institutional capture,"
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- N. Chesterley & P. Roberti, 2016. "Populism and Institutional Capture," Working Papers wp1086, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Tella, Rafael Di & Rotemberg, Julio J., 2018.
"Populism and the return of the “Paranoid Style”: Some evidence and a simple model of demand for incompetence as insurance against elite betrayal,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 988-1005.
- Rafael Di Tella & Julio J. Rotemberg, 2016. "Populism and the Return of the “Paranoid Style”: Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal," NBER Working Papers 22975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Randall G. Holcombe, 2018. "Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Economies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(4), pages 1-12, October.
- María Clara Arroyo, 2018. "The Effect of Executive Constraints on Reform Implementation: An Empirical Analysis," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0118, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Bjørnskov, Christian & Voigt, Stefan, 2018. "Why do governments call a state of emergency? On the determinants of using emergency constitutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 110-123.
- Xavier Debrun & Tidiane Kinda, 2017.
"Strengthening Post‐Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise – A New Dataset,"
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JEL classification:
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
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