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Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna

Listed author(s):
  • Jan Fałkowski
  • Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

Artykuł ma na celu wskazanie najważniejszych wątków z powstałej na przestrzeni ostatnich lat literatury wyjaśniającej powody ustanawiania konstytucji, ich trwania i zmian oraz powiązanie tych rozważań z zagadnieniami dotyczącymi wpływu konstytucji na gospodarkę. Zaprezentowana dyskusja czerpie przede wszystkim z osiągnięć ekonomii konstytucyjnej, nowej ekonomii politycznej i ekonomicznej analizy prawa, sięgając m.in. do wytłumaczeń nawiązujących do teorii praw własności, teorii grup interesu, czy analiz rozkładu siły politycznej pomiędzy różne grupy w społeczeństwie. Przedstawione rozważania pozwalają zidentyfikować podstawowe czynniki kształtujące proces ustanawiania reguł konstytucyjnych oraz ich trwałość, naświetlając jednocześnie cztery kanały, poprzez które konstytucja może wpływać na gospodarkę. W tym kontekście, uwaga koncentruje się na (1) znaczeniu, jakie konstytucja ma dla wzmacniania wiarygodności obietnic składanych przez elity polityczne; (2) na roli jaką odgrywa ona przy zwiększaniu stabilności politycznej w państwie; (3) na działalności grup interesu czerpiących wymierne korzyści z konkretnych zapisów konstytucyjnych; oraz (4) na kosztach transakcyjnych, które różni aktorzy społeczni ponoszą, czy to z konieczności dostosowania się do obowiązujących reguł czy też z chęci ich obejścia. Sformułowane w artykule wnioski mogą stanowić podstawę do dalszych badań poświęconych, np. potencjalnej substytucyjności bądź komplementarności pomiędzy niektórymi regułami konstytucyjnymi, jak i tych koncentrujących się na problemie endogenizacji konstytucji.

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File URL: http://gospodarkanarodowa.sgh.waw.pl/p/gospodarka_narodowa_2015_03_04.pdf
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Article provided by Warsaw School of Economics in its journal Gospodarka Narodowa.

Volume (Year): (2015)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 79-105

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Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2015:i:3:p:79-105
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