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Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Fałkowski
  • Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

Abstract

Artykuł ma na celu wskazanie najważniejszych wątków z powstałej na przestrzeni ostatnich lat literatury wyjaśniającej powody ustanawiania konstytucji, ich trwania i zmian oraz powiązanie tych rozważań z zagadnieniami dotyczącymi wpływu konstytucji na gospodarkę. Zaprezentowana dyskusja czerpie przede wszystkim z osiągnięć ekonomii konstytucyjnej, nowej ekonomii politycznej i ekonomicznej analizy prawa, sięgając m.in. do wytłumaczeń nawiązujących do teorii praw własności, teorii grup interesu, czy analiz rozkładu siły politycznej pomiędzy różne grupy w społeczeństwie. Przedstawione rozważania pozwalają zidentyfikować podstawowe czynniki kształtujące proces ustanawiania reguł konstytucyjnych oraz ich trwałość, naświetlając jednocześnie cztery kanały, poprzez które konstytucja może wpływać na gospodarkę. W tym kontekście, uwaga koncentruje się na (1) znaczeniu, jakie konstytucja ma dla wzmacniania wiarygodności obietnic składanych przez elity polityczne; (2) na roli jaką odgrywa ona przy zwiększaniu stabilności politycznej w państwie; (3) na działalności grup interesu czerpiących wymierne korzyści z konkretnych zapisów konstytucyjnych; oraz (4) na kosztach transakcyjnych, które różni aktorzy społeczni ponoszą, czy to z konieczności dostosowania się do obowiązujących reguł czy też z chęci ich obejścia. Sformułowane w artykule wnioski mogą stanowić podstawę do dalszych badań poświęconych, np. potencjalnej substytucyjności bądź komplementarności pomiędzy niektórymi regułami konstytucyjnymi, jak i tych koncentrujących się na problemie endogenizacji konstytucji.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Fałkowski & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2015. "Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna," Gospodarka Narodowa, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 79-105.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2015:i:3:p:79-105
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ekonomia konstytucyjna; nowa ekonomia polityczna; konstytucja; ekonomiczna analiza prawa; endogeniczne instytucje;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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