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Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?

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  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

Empirical constitutional economics has made a huge leap forward over the last decade. Interesting insights into the effects of constitutions have been discovered. Rather than summarizing the state of the art, this paper identifies some of the current shortcomings and proposes a number of extensions. It calls for recognizing additional constitutional institutions as explanatory variables, as well as the incorporation of additional dependent variables. Its major emphasis is, however, on calling for the next logical step in this field, namely to endogenize constitutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 319-330.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:2:p:319-330 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kantorowicz, Jarosław & Köppl-Turyna, Monika, 2017. "Disentangling fiscal effects of local constitutions," Working Papers 06, Agenda Austria.
    2. Jan Fałkowski & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2015. "Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna," Gospodarka Narodowa, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 79-105.
    3. Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2016. "Reassessing the Economic Effects of Post-Socialist Constitutions Using the Synthetic Control Method," Working Papers 2016-18, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    4. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Zohal Hessami, 2014. "Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems: Evidence from Germany," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2014-17, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    5. Mark Hallerberg & Carlos Scartascini, 2011. "Economic Crisis and Fiscal Reforms in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3092, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Luca Bettarelli & Michela Cella & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2015. "It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes," Working Papers 309, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2015.
    7. Budzinski, Oliver & Eckert, Sandra, 2015. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 93, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    8. Caruso, Germán & Scartascini, Carlos & Tommasi, Mariano, 2015. "Are we all playing the same game? The economic effects of constitutions depend on the degree of institutionalization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, pages 212-228.
    9. Martin Ardanaz & Carlos Scartascini, 2013. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Do Budget Institutions Make Forms of Government More Alike?," Research Department Publications IDB-WP-427, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    10. C�l�rier, Claire & Kick, Thomas & Ongena, Steven, 2017. "Changes in the Cost of Bank Equity and the Supply of Bank Credit," CEPR Discussion Papers 12172, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Mariano Tommasi & Carlos Scartascini & Germán Caruso, 2013. "Are We All Playing the Same Game?: The Economic Effects of Constitutions Depend on the Degree of Institutionalization," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 4612, Inter-American Development Bank.
    12. Bettareli, Luca & Cella, Michela & Iannantuoni, Giovanna & Manzoni, Elena, 2017. "It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes," MPRA Paper 77546, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Martin Ardanaz & Carlos Scartascini, 2014. "The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 301-329.
    14. Vegas, E & Ganimian, A. J., 2013. "Theory and Evidence on Teacher Policies in Developed and Developing Countries," Working Paper 104291, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    15. María Franco Chuaire & Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi, 2017. "State capacity and the quality of policies. Revisiting the relationship between openness and government size," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, pages 133-156.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Positive constitutional economics; Endogenous constitutions;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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