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Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?

  • Voigt, Stefan

Empirical constitutional economics has made a huge leap forward over the last decade. Interesting insights into the effects of constitutions have been discovered. Rather than summarizing the state of the art, this paper identifies some of the current shortcomings and proposes a number of extensions. It calls for recognizing additional constitutional institutions as explanatory variables, as well as the incorporation of additional dependent variables. Its major emphasis is, however, on calling for the next logical step in this field, namely to endogenize constitutions.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 80 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 319-330

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:2:p:319-330
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.024
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  1. Keefer, Philip, 2004. "What does political economy tell us about economic development - and vice versa?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3250, The World Bank.
  2. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2010. "Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why do Countries Change their Form of Governments?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3087, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Peter Murrell, 2009. "Design and Evolution in Institutional Development: The Insignificance of the English Bill of Rights," Electronic Working Papers 09-001, University of Maryland, Department of Economics.
  4. Brennan, Geoffrey & Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. "Finite Lives and Social Institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 551-71.
  5. Trostel, Philip A, 1993. "The Effect of Taxation on Human Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 327-50, April.
  6. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
  7. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2013. "Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don’t," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-61.
  8. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 249-269, September.
  9. Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin Kocher, . "Choosing the carrot or the stick? ? Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations," Working Papers 2008-07, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  10. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611.
  11. Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2002. "Endogenous constitutions," Economics Working Papers 896, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2005.
  12. Acemoglu, Daron & Cantoni, Davide & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A, 2009. "The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 7245, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Kocher, Martin G. & Strauß, Sabine & Sutter, Matthias, 2006. "Individual or team decision-making-Causes and consequences of self-selection," Munich Reprints in Economics 18162, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  14. Lawrence Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt, 2007. "The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment," CESifo Working Paper Series 2149, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2008. "Endogenous Presidentialism," NBER Working Papers 14603, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Dollar, David & Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2001. "Are women really the "fairer" sex? Corruption and women in government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 423-429, December.
  17. Katharina Pistor, 2002. "The Demand for Constitutional Law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 73-87, March.
  18. Timothy Besley, 2007. "The New Political Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(524), pages F570-F587, November.
  19. Peter Ordeshook, 1992. "Constitutional stability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-175, March.
  20. Alberto Alesina & Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Reply to Blankart and Koester's Political Economics versus Public Choice Two Views of Political Economy in Competition," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 201-208, 05.
  21. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutions and Economic Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 75-98, Winter.
  22. Stefan Voigt, 2009. "Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200936, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  23. Stefan Voigt, 1996. "Pure eclecticism—The tool kit of the constitutional economist," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 177-196, September.
  24. John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Direct Democracy Works," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 185-206, Spring.
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