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It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes

Listed author(s):
  • Luca Bettarelli
  • Michela Cella
  • Giovanna Iannantuoni
  • Elena Manzoni

The effect of constitutional structures (such as the effect of a presidential vs. a parliamentary system) over policy outcomes has been widely studied in the economic literature. In this paper, we investigate whether stable parliamentary systems and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policy outcomes they implement. We show that accounting for the stability of parliamentary systems generates results that are more robust compared to the previous literature. More precisely, we find that stable parliamentary systems are significantly different both from presidential and from unstable parliamentary ones. Moreover, we show that this result is robust to changes in the set of countries, and to changes in the definition of stability. Finally, we discuss how these results are consistent with the presence of a selection effect in parliamentary systems.

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File URL: http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper309.pdf
File Function: First version, 2015
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Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 309.

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Length: 28
Date of creation: Sep 2015
Date of revision: Sep 2015
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:309
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  1. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2013. "Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don’t," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-61.
  2. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December.
  3. Daniel Diermeier & Razvan Vlaicu, 2011. "Executive Control and Legislative Success," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 846-871.
  4. Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt & Carsten Wolf, 2009. "The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 197-225, April.
  5. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
  6. Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 319-330.
  7. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"," NBER Working Papers 11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Brennan, Geoffrey & Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. "Finite Lives and Social Institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 551-571.
  9. Michela Cella & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2014. "Constitutional Rules and Efficient Policies," Working Papers 270, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2014.
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