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Do constitutions matter? Evidence from a natural experiment at the municipality level

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  • Florian Ade

Abstract

This paper asks if it does matter for taxes and government spending whether the mayor is elected (and recalled) by direct election or by the municipal council. It thus contributes to the economic literature on the impact of constitutions on economic outcomes. The effects are identified based on reforms of the municipal constitutions that were exogenous from the point of view of the municipalities in content and timing: each year, quasi-randomly selected groups of municipalities introduced the new constitution. This setup helps overcome endogeneity and identification issues that are common to many studies in the field using country level data. Using a new panel dataset of the 686 municipalities in three German states, this paper shows that direct mayoral election and recall through referendum only (as opposed to election and recall through the municipal council) reduce tax rates and increases spending on government employees. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Ade, 2014. "Do constitutions matter? Evidence from a natural experiment at the municipality level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 367-389, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:160:y:2014:i:3:p:367-389
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0084-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Scott Dallman & Anusha Nath & Filip Premik, 2021. "The Effect of Constitutional Provisions on Education Policy and Outcomes," Staff Report 623, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    2. Stefanie Gaebler & Felix Roesel, 2019. "Do direct elections matter? Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(6), pages 1416-1445, December.
    3. Monika Köppl-Turyna, 2016. "Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 177-216, September.
    4. Akee, Randall & Jorgensen, Miriam & Sunde, Uwe, 2015. "Critical junctures and economic development – Evidence from the adoption of constitutions among American Indian Nations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 844-861.
    5. Stefanie Gäbler & Rösel Felix, 2019. "Direkt gewählte Politiker straffen die Verwaltung," ifo Dresden berichtet, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 26(04), pages 03-07, August.
    6. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    7. Ronny Freier & Sebastian Thomasius, 2016. "Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(5), pages 875-910, October.
    8. Lewis, Blane D., 2022. "The impact of democratic elections on taxation: Quasi-experimental evidence from subnational Indonesia," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    9. Geschwind, Stephan & Roesel, Felix, 2022. "Taxation under direct democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 536-554.
    10. Sebastian Garmann, 2017. "The effect of a reduction in the opening hours of polling stations on turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 99-117, April.
    11. Garmann, Sebastian, 2015. "Elected or appointed? How the nomination scheme of the city manager influences the effects of government fragmentation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 26-42.
    12. Jaaidane, Touria & Larribeau, Sophie, 2023. "The effects of inter-municipal cooperation and central grant allocation on the size of the French local public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    13. Martin Gross & Marc Debus, 2018. "Gaining new insights by going local: determinants of coalition formation in mixed democratic polities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 61-80, January.
    14. Touria Jaaidane & Sophie Larribeau, 2021. "When Cooperation tames the Leviathan and Partisan-distorted Grant Allocation feeds it: Evidence from French Municipalities," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2021-04, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional economics; Division of powers; Municipalities; Presidential government; Parliamentary government; Government spending; Tax rate; Mayor; Natural experiment; D72; H11; H71; H72; K10; R51;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies

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