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Do The Right Thing. A comparison of politicians' incentives across constitutional systems

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  • Michela Cella
  • Giovanna Iannantuoni
  • Elena Manzoni

Abstract

Constitutional structures shape politicians' behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the different incentive schemes at work. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. Such a comparison is carried over by analysing how the two systems are able to select the efficient policy in presence of asymmetric information. The constitutional structures differ in that the policy proposal in parliamentary democracies is observable and confidence-dependent. The main findings suggest that the parliament responds to the incentive scheme better in presidential systems due to less uncertainty that legislators face over their term limit. However, the parliamentary system induces the executive to behave more efficiently due to selection and disciplining effeects.

Suggested Citation

  • Michela Cella & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Elena Manzoni, 2015. "Do The Right Thing. A comparison of politicians' incentives across constitutional systems," Working Papers 290, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2015.
  • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:290
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    File URL: http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper290.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2015
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Diermeier & Razvan Vlaicu, 2011. "Executive Control and Legislative Success," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 846-871.
    2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, January.
    3. Besley, Timothy, 2007. "Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199283910.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bettareli, Luca & Cella, Michela & Iannantuoni, Giovanna & Manzoni, Elena, 2017. "It's a matter of confidence: Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes," MPRA Paper 77546, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    presidential system; parliamentary system; confidence vote; hierarchical accountability;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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