Do The Right Thing. A comparison of politicians' incentives across constitutional systems
Constitutional structures shape politicians' behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the different incentive schemes at work. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. Such a comparison is carried over by analysing how the two systems are able to select the efficient policy in presence of asymmetric information. The constitutional structures differ in that the policy proposal in parliamentary democracies is observable and confidence-dependent. The main findings suggest that the parliament responds to the incentive scheme better in presidential systems due to less uncertainty that legislators face over their term limit. However, the parliamentary system induces the executive to behave more efficiently due to selection and disciplining effeects.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2015|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2015|
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- Daniel Diermeier & Razvan Vlaicu, 2011. "Executive Control and Legislative Success," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 846-871.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, July.
- Besley, Timothy, 2007. "Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199283910.
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