IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jpolmo/v47y2025i2p358-370.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Politically optimal lockdowns with vaccine hesitancy: Theory and evidence from Switzerland

Author

Listed:
  • Stankov, Petar

Abstract

Literature on optimal lockdowns is abundant. However, when are lockdowns politically optimal? Specifically, is there a level of restrictions that a majority will be ready to tolerate, thereby minimising political conflict over optimal policy choices? The answers emerge from an extended voter preferences framework, where citizens living in a pandemic choose their vaccination status, and some are vaccine-hesitant. The model demonstrates that a society will be ready to tolerate harder restrictions when citizens are more productive or their vaccine salience is higher. However, the productivity and vaccine salience effects are mitigated by the government’s capacity for fiscal transfers. Similar to other political economy models of intra-pandemic societies, zero restrictions emerge as politically optimal in societies with sufficiently high vaccine hesitancy or low productivity. Canton-level evidence from the 2021 Swiss referendum on expanding COVID-19 restrictions offers strong support for the theory. A discussion of policy implications completes the analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Stankov, Petar, 2025. "Politically optimal lockdowns with vaccine hesitancy: Theory and evidence from Switzerland," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 358-370.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:47:y:2025:i:2:p:358-370
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2025.01.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0161893825000080
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2025.01.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comparative political economy; Lockdown; Optimal restrictions; Vaccine hesitancy; COVID-19;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:47:y:2025:i:2:p:358-370. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505735 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.