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Can new constitutions tighten the reins? The effect of constitutional change on constitutional compliance

Author

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  • Gutmann, Jerg
  • Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna
  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

Constitutional compliance varies significantly across countries and over time. One might, therefore, expect that constitutional change is systematically used to bring constitutional rules in line with constitutional practice. We investigate whether constitutional change indeed induces better compliance by the government with the constitution. Using an event study design to analyze constitutional changes in 171 countries between 1951 and 2020, we find that new constitutions lead to durable improvements in constitutional compliance in democracies. The effect of constitutional change in nondemocracies, however, is small and short-lived.

Suggested Citation

  • Gutmann, Jerg & Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna & Voigt, Stefan, 2025. "Can new constitutions tighten the reins? The effect of constitutional change on constitutional compliance," ILE Working Paper Series 90, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ilewps:90
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K38 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Human Rights Law; Gender Law; Animal Rights Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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