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Constitutional Overperformance – An Empirical Study of De Facto Protection of Rights with No De Jure Equivalents

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  • Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)

  • Anna Lewczuk

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)

Abstract

In this paper we aim to contribute to the debate on successful enforcement of constitutional rules and its determinants by extending the focus to the phenomenon of constitutional overperformance, which arises when countries that do not include certain de jure rights in their constitutions, nevertheless de facto observe them. Firstly, we provide evidence that constitutional overperformance is a common phenomenon around the globe. Secondly, we identify factors which contribute to it, classifying them into three groups: (1) characteristics of a given country’s constitution (such as its comprehensiveness or age); (2) characteristics of the country itself, pertaining to its institutions (such as its democratization level, degree of judicial independence or legal origins) and socio-economic conditions (e.g. economic development, or presence of political conflict); as well as (3) spatial effects (diffusion of rights protection between neighboring countries). We base the conclusions on an empirical study conducted for a global sample of more than 100 countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Anna Lewczuk, 2019. "Constitutional Overperformance – An Empirical Study of De Facto Protection of Rights with No De Jure Equivalents," Working Papers 2019-08, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    • Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2019-08
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    File URL: https://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/index.php/download_file/4826/
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    Cited by:

    1. Katarzyna Metelska‐Szaniawska, 2021. "Post‐socialist constitutions: The de jure–de facto gap, its effects and determinantsa," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(2), pages 175-196, April.
    2. Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Jacek Lewkowicz, 2021. "Post-socialist “illiberal democracies”: do de jure constitutional rights matter?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 233-265, June.
    3. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2023. "Historical Representative Assembly Experiences and Constitutionalism Today," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 65(4), pages 665-680, December.
    4. Jerg Gutmann & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Stefan Voigt, 2024. "The comparative constitutional compliance database," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 95-115, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    : constitutional overperformance; constitutional enforcement; democracy; spatial regression models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • K38 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Human Rights Law; Gender Law; Animal Rights Law

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