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When to Expect a Coup D'État? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants

Author

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  • Martin Gassebner
  • Jerg Gutmann
  • Stefan Voigt

Abstract

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d’état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Gassebner & Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2016. "When to Expect a Coup D'État? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants," CESifo Working Paper Series 6065, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6065
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    Cited by:

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    6. Bjørnskov, Christian & Pfaff, Katharina, 2021. "Differences matter: The effect of coup types on physical integrity rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    7. Taku Yukawa & Kaoru Hidaka & Kaori Kushima & Masafumi Fujita, 2022. "Coup d’état and a democratic signal: The connection between protests and coups after the Cold War," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(6), pages 828-843, November.
    8. Gerling, Lena, 2017. "Riots and the Window of Opportunity for Coup Plotters: Evidence on the Link between Urban Protests and Coups d’État," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168054, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    9. Jetter, Michael & Mahmood, Rafat & Parmeter, Christopher F. & Ramirez Hassan, Andres, 2020. "Explaining Post-Cold-War Civil Conflict among 17 Billion Models: The Importance of History and Religion," IZA Discussion Papers 13511, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Pablo Duarte & Bernd Süssmuth, 2018. "Implementing an Approximate Dynamic Factor Model to Nowcast GDP Using Sensitivity Analysis," Journal of Business Cycle Research, Springer;Centre for International Research on Economic Tendency Surveys (CIRET), vol. 14(1), pages 127-141, April.
    11. Antonis Adam & Kostas Karanatsis, 2019. "Sovereign Defaults and Democracy," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 61(1), pages 36-62, March.
    12. Todd Sandler, 2016. "Political violence: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 161-170, December.
    13. Jetter, Michael & Mahmood, Rafat & Parmeter, Christopher F. & Ramírez-Hassan, Andrés, 2022. "Post-Cold War civil conflict and the role of history and religion: A stochastic search variable selection approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    14. Gerling, Lena, 2017. "Riots and the window of opportunity for coup plotters: Evidence on the link between urban protests and coups d'état," CIW Discussion Papers 2/2017, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    15. Bjørnskov, Christian & Freytag, Andreas & Gutmann, Jerg, 2022. "Coups and the dynamics of media freedom," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    16. Freire, Danilo & Uzonyi, Gary, 2018. "What Drives State-Sponsored Violence?: Evidence from Extreme Bounds Analysis and Ensemble Learning Models," SocArXiv pzx3q, Center for Open Science.
    17. Espen Geelmuyden Rød & Carl Henrik Knutsen & Håvard Hegre, 2020. "The determinants of democracy: a sensitivity analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 87-111, October.
    18. Tjeerd M. Boonman & Andrea E. Sanchez Urbina, 2020. "Extreme Bounds Analysis in Early Warning Systems for Currency Crises," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 431-470, April.
    19. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2018. "Rent extraction, revolutionary threat, and coups in non-democracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1082-1103.
    20. Dirks, Maximilian & Schmidt, Torsten, 2023. "The relationship between political instability and economic growth in advanced economies: Empirical evidence from a panel VAR and a dynamic panel FE-IV analysis," Ruhr Economic Papers 1000, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    21. Johannes Blum & Klaus Gründler, 2020. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 73(08), pages 41-44, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coups d'état; military coups; coup-proofing; extreme bounds analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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