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When to Expect a Coup D'État? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Gassebner
  • Jerg Gutmann
  • Stefan Voigt

Abstract

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d’état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Gassebner & Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2016. "When to Expect a Coup D'État? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants," CESifo Working Paper Series 6065, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6065
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    Cited by:

    1. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2016. "Precision-Guided or Blunt? The Effects of US Economic Sanctions on Human Rights," ILE Working Paper Series 2, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    2. Gerling, Lena, 2017. "Riots and the Window of Opportunity for Coup Plotters: Evidence on the Link between Urban Protests and Coups d’État," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168054, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Duarte, Pablo & Süßmuth, Bernd, 2018. "Implementing an approximate dynamic factor model to nowcast GDP using sensitivity analysis," Working Papers 152, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science.
    4. Todd Sandler, 2016. "Political violence: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 161-170, December.
    5. Gerling, Lena, 2017. "Riots and the window of opportunity for coup plotters: Evidence on the link between urban protests and coups d'état," CIW Discussion Papers 2/2017, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    coups d’état; military coups; coup-proofing; extreme bounds analysis;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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