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Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups d'Etat

Listed author(s):
  • Leon, G.

Coups d'etat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and coups and find that (i) successful coups increase military spending by more than failed attempts, and (ii) coups are more likely when military spending as a share of GDP is relatively low. Our identification strategy exploits the conditional independence between a coup's outcome and the change in military spending that follows it. We interpret this as evidence that the military may stage coups in order to increase its

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File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1209.pdf
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 1209.

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Date of creation: 27 Feb 2012
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1209
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

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