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Evolution of Risk and Political Regimes

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  • Maria Petrova

    (New Economic School)

  • Robert Bates

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

The article contributes to the growing literature on intermediate regiimes by presenting a model that incorporates key features of such regimes and generates several of the "stylized facts" that characterize their behavior: their political volatility, cross nationality and over time, and the veriability of their economic performance something that renders their economies among the fastest growing and declining in global samples. Using an instrumental veriables approach, we test the model employing cross-national data.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Petrova & Robert Bates, 2010. "Evolution of Risk and Political Regimes," Working Papers w0137, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  • Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0137
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