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A Game‐Theoretic Model Of The CouP D'État

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  • Daniel Sutter

Abstract

I explore the comparative vulnerability of regimes to a coup d'état using a game‐theoretic model. Analysis centers on leaders of groups capable of intervening at the time of a coup. I prove the existence of an equilibrium in which a coup is attempted without restrictions on current government policy, the breadth of participation in politics, or the relative size of the conspiracy. Comparative statics results concerning the willingness of plotters to stage a coup and other leaders to join a coup once under way are established. Differences in comparative regime vulnerability stem from differences in the amount of organization required to attempt a coup.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Sutter, 2000. "A Game‐Theoretic Model Of The CouP D'État," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 205-223, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:205-223
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00075
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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriel Leon, 2014. "Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 363-383, June.
    2. Emmanuelle Auriol & Jean-Philippe Platteau & Thierry Verdier, 2023. "The Quran and the Sword," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1772-1820.

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