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Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups?

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  • Frode Martin Nordvik

Abstract

A large literature investigates the relation between oil and conflict, yet no empirical study has found any link between oil and coups d’´etat. Using a new data set on oil production separated into onshore and offshore production, and covering 172 countries from 1900 to 2012, onshore oil is seen to promote coup while offshore oil prevents them. A likely mechanism is that onshore oil motivates military build-ups, while offshore oil does not. From a political leader’s point of view, a large military is a double-edged sword, because it may turn against him and stage a coup.

Suggested Citation

  • Frode Martin Nordvik, 2014. "Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups?," Working Papers No 7/2014, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:bny:wpaper:0025
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    File URL: https://www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/camp/working-papers/2014/working_camp_7-2014.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Pelzl, Paul & Poelhekke, Steven, 2021. "Good mine, bad mine: Natural resource heterogeneity and Dutch disease in Indonesia," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    2. Jørgen Juel Andersen & Frode Martin Nordvik & Andrea Tesei, 2017. "Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore)," Working Papers 810, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; natural resoruces; coups d'état; military spending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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