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Precision-Guided or Blunt? The Effects of US Economic Sanctions on Human Rights

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Listed:
  • Jerg Gutmann

    (University of Hamburg)

  • Matthias Neuenkirch

    () (University of Trier)

  • Florian Neumeier

    () (University of Marburg)

Abstract

We use endogenous treatment-regression models to estimate the causal average treatment effect of US economic sanctions on four types of human rights. In contrast to previous studies, we find no support for adverse effects of sanctions on economic rights, political and civil rights, and basic human rights. With respect to women’s rights, our findings even indicate a positive relationship. Emancipatory rights are, on average, strengthened when a country faces sanctions by the US. Our findings are robust when applying various changes to the empirical specification. Most importantly, this study provides strong evidence that the endogeneity of treatment assignment must be modelled when the consequences of sanctions are studied empirically.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2016. "Precision-Guided or Blunt? The Effects of US Economic Sanctions on Human Rights," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201627, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201627
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    Cited by:

    1. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian & Steinbach, Armin, 2018. "Economic sanctions and human rights: Quantifying the legal proportionality principle," ILE Working Paper Series 12, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    2. repec:ris:utmsje:0250 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2017. "Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Life Expectancy and its Gender Gap," ILE Working Paper Series 11, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    4. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:4:p:2116-2136 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Florian Neumeier, 2018. "Do Businessmen Make Good Governors?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2116-2136, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democratization; Discrimination; Economic Sanctions; Endogenous Treatment Model; Human Rights; Interventionism; Protectionism; Repression; United States;

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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