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Dictatorship in a Single Export Crop Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Lode Berlage
  • Bart Capeau
  • Philip Verwimp

Abstract

Is it a matter of pure altruism or shortsightedness when a dictator spends an increasing amount of his revenues for the population, while cutting on own consumption? In order to be able to consume, the dictator first has to stay in power. We present a formal model of a power maximizing dictator. His revenues depend on the exports of a single crop. With the export earnings the dictator buys loyalty from the producers of the export crop by setting the domestic producer price. Revenues resulting from the di®erence between the international and the domestic price of the crop are used to finance a repressive apparatus. We characterize the optimal trade-o® between buying more loyalty and adapting the level of repression. The model is illustrated with a case study of Rwanda under president Habyarimana (1973-94).

Suggested Citation

  • Lode Berlage & Bart Capeau & Philip Verwimp, 2003. "Dictatorship in a Single Export Crop Economy," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0311, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0311
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Kolleen J. Rask & Norman Rask, 2017. "The Impact of Regime Type on Food Consumption in Low Income Countries," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 59(1), pages 107-125, March.

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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