IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v16y2004i1p29-51.html

International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator

Author

Listed:
  • William H. Kaempfer
  • Anton D. Lowenberg
  • William Mertens

Abstract

Wintrobe's (1990, 1998) dictatorship model is adapted to examine the impacts of economic sanctions on an autocrat. It is shown that the dictator's choice of the level of power, and the quantities of loyalty and repression used as inputs in the production of power, are affected by the type and magnitude of sanctions and by the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups. Sanctions have direct and indirect effects on the prices of loyalty and repression as well as potentially generating rents that might be captured either by the dictator or by the opposition.

Suggested Citation

  • William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg & William Mertens, 2004. "International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 29-51, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:29-51
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00130.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00130.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00130.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    3. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 1994. "Economic Diplomacy, Trade And Commercial Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 447, August.
    4. Lam, San Ling, 1990. "Economic sanctions and the success of foreign policy goals : A critical evaluation," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 239-248, September.
    5. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, October.
    6. Chao Jing & William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, 2003. "Instrument Choice and the Effectiveness of International Sanctions: A Simultaneous Equations Approach," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 40(5), pages 519-535, September.
    7. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1998. "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 829-844, December.
    8. Niskanen, William A, 1997. "Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 464-479, July.
    9. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, January.
    10. Herschel I. Grossman & Suk Jae Noh, 1990. "A Theory Of Kleptocracy With Probabilistic Survival And Reputation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 157-171, July.
    11. Wintrobe, Ronald, 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 849-872, September.
    12. Peter A. G. VAN Bergeijk, 1989. "Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 385-404, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    2. Petrevski, Goran, 2025. "Economic sanctions and output growth: Empirical evidence," EconStor Preprints 325283, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Demena, B.A. & Benalcazar Jativa, G. & Reta, A.S. & Kimararungu, P.B. & van Bergeijk, P.A.G., 2021. "Does research on economic sanctions suffer from publication bias?," ISS Working Papers - General Series 674, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    4. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    5. Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou, 2019. "Do sanctions lead to a decline in civil liberties?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 191-215, September.
    6. Valentin L. Krustev & T. Clifton Morgan, 2011. "Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 351-376, September.
    7. Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov, 2011. "Incumbency Advantage in Nondemocratic Elections," 2011 Meeting Papers 417, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Jess Benhabib & Adam Przeworski, 2010. "Economic growth under political accountability," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 77-95, March.
    9. Roland Kirstein & Stefan Voigt, 2006. "The Violent and the Weak," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 863-889, October.
    10. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2009. "Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International Trade," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13518, August.
    11. Jody Overland & Kenneth Simons & Michael Spagat, 2005. "Political instability and growth in dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 445-470, December.
    12. Dreger, Christian & Kholodilin, Konstantin A. & Ulbricht, Dirk & Fidrmuc, Jarko, 2016. "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of Economic Sanctions and Oil Prices on Russia’s Ruble," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 44(2), pages 295-308.
    13. Sajjad Faraji Dizaji & Peter A G van Bergeijk, 2013. "Potential early phase success and ultimate failure of economic sanctions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 50(6), pages 721-736, November.
    14. Jin Mun Jeong & Dursun Peksen, 2019. "Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 194-217, January.
    15. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
    16. Raul Caruso, 2021. "Economic Statecraft: from Negative Sanctions to Positive Sanctions," Working Papers 1010, European Centre of Peace Science, Integration and Cooperation (CESPIC), Catholic University 'Our Lady of Good Counsel'.
    17. Robert T. Deacon & Sarani Saha, 2006. "Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey," Chapters, in: Attiat F. Ott & Richard J. Cebula (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Economics, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. van Bergeijk, Peter A. G. & van Marrewijk, Charles, 1995. "Why do sanctions need time to work? Adjustment, learning and anticipation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 75-86, April.
    19. Sezer Yasar & Ceyhun Elgin, 2024. "Democracy and fiscal-policy response to COVID-19," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(1), pages 25-45, January.
    20. Ankudinov, Andrei & Ibragimov, Rustam & Lebedev, Oleg, 2017. "Sanctions and the Russian stock market," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 150-162.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:29-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.