Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government
All types of government face two major fiscal decisions: the level of government services and the average tax rate. This paper develops models of autocratic, democratic, and optimal government. The effects of alternative government structures are estimated using a common set of parameters based on U.S. data. Output and government services are higher in a democracy than in an autocracy, but the tax rate is lower. Output is even higher with an optimal government and both government services and the tax rate are lower. The relative outcomes in any government depend strongly on the fiscal horizon of those who govern. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 35 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|