IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/3537_6.html

Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey

In: The Elgar Companion to Public Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Robert T. Deacon
  • Sarani Saha

Abstract

Attiat Ott and Richard Cebula have recognised the need to present, in an accessible and straightforward way, the voluminous literature in the public economics arena. Advances in econometric techniques and the spillover of knowledge from other disciplines made it difficult, not only for students but also for lecturers, to accurately find the information they need.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert T. Deacon & Sarani Saha, 2006. "Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey," Chapters, in: Attiat F. Ott & Richard J. Cebula (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Economics, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3537_6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/1843769573.00017.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Strand, Jon, 2013. "Political economy aspects of fuel subsidies : a conceptual framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6392, The World Bank.
    2. Mare Sarr & Katharina Wick, 2010. "Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 183-205, April.
    3. Martin Roessler, 2019. "Political regimes and publicly provided goods: why democracy needs development," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 301-331, September.
    4. van Beers, Cees & Strand, Jon, 2013. "Political determinants of fossil fuel pricing," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6470, The World Bank.
    5. Karim Khan & Saima Batool & Anwar Shah, 2016. "Authoritarian Regimes and Economic Development: An Empirical Reflection," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 657-673.
    6. Saha, Sarani, 2007. "Democratic Institutions and Provision of Public Good," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt55f3c17g, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    7. Allcott, Hunt & Lederman, Daniel & Lopez, Ramon, 2006. "Political institutions, inequality, and agricultural growth : the public expenditure connection," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3902, The World Bank.
    8. Richard T. Carson, 2010. "The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Seeking Empirical Regularity and Theoretical Structure," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 3-23, Winter.
    9. Hilary Sigman, 2014. "Decentralization and Environmental Quality: An International Analysis of Water Pollution Levels and Variation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(1), pages 114-130.
    10. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Sajjad Faraji Dizaji, 2014. "Political Institutions and Government Spending Behavior in Iran," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201403, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    11. Robert Deacon, 2009. "Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 241-262, April.
    12. Karim Khan & Anwar Shah, 2019. "Dictatorships, Patronage and Public Good Provision: Some Empirics," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 58(3), pages 239-264.
    13. Carson, Richard T, 2009. "Searching for Empirical Regularity and Theoretical Structure: The Environmental Kuznets Curve," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4m6263c2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    14. Kammas, Pantelis & Sarantides, Vassilis, 2019. "Do dictatorships redistribute more?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 176-195.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3537_6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Darrel McCalla (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.