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Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey

In: The Elgar Companion to Public Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Robert T. Deacon
  • Sarani Saha

Abstract

Attiat Ott and Richard Cebula have recognised the need to present, in an accessible and straightforward way, the voluminous literature in the public economics arena. Advances in econometric techniques and the spillover of knowledge from other disciplines made it difficult, not only for students but also for lecturers, to accurately find the information they need.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert T. Deacon & Sarani Saha, 2006. "Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey," Chapters, in: Attiat F. Ott & Richard J. Cebula (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Economics, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3537_6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
    2. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1999. "Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Analysis," NBER Working Papers 7084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    5. Welsch, Heinz, 2004. "Corruption, growth, and the environment: a cross-country analysis," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(5), pages 663-693, October.
    6. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611.
    7. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    8. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1243-1284.
    9. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
    10. Niskanen, William A, 1997. "Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 464-479, July.
    11. repec:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:03:p:849-872_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002. "Electoral Systems and Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657.
    13. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Strand, Jon, 2013. "Political economy aspects of fuel subsidies : a conceptual framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6392, The World Bank.
    2. Mare Sarr & Katharina Wick, 2010. "Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 183-205, April.
    3. repec:kap:pubcho:v:180:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00638-y is not listed on IDEAS
    4. van Beers, Cees & Strand, Jon, 2013. "Political determinants of fossil fuel pricing," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6470, The World Bank.
    5. repec:pid:journl:v:55:y:2016:i:4:p:657-673 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Saha, Sarani, 2007. "Democratic Institutions and Provision of Public Good," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt55f3c17g, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    7. Allcott, Hunt & Lederman, Daniel & Lopez, Ramon, 2006. "Political institutions, inequality, and agricultural growth : the public expenditure connection," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3902, The World Bank.
    8. Sajjad Faraji Dizaji & Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, 2014. "Political Institutions and Government Spending Behavior in Iran," CESifo Working Paper Series 4620, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Kammas, Pantelis & Sarantides, Vassilis, 2019. "Do dictatorships redistribute more?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 176-195.
    10. Richard T. Carson, 2010. "The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Seeking Empirical Regularity and Theoretical Structure," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 3-23, Winter.
    11. Carson, Richard T, 2009. "Searching for Empirical Regularity and Theoretical Structure: The Environmental Kuznets Curve," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4m6263c2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    12. Hilary Sigman, 2014. "Decentralization and Environmental Quality: An International Analysis of Water Pollution Levels and Variation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(1), pages 114-130.
    13. Robert Deacon, 2009. "Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 241-262, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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