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Public Good Provision by Dictatorships: A Survey

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  • Deacon, Robert
  • Saha, Sarani

Abstract

All dictatorships provide public goods, but levels of provision generally differ from those found in otherwise similar democracies. Some theoretical treatments of this phenomenon emphasize differences in the degree of monopoly power enjoyed by dictators versus leaders of governments, while others stress differences in the size of the group a dictatorial versus democratic government leader must satisfy in order to remain in office. Empirical analysis is still at an early stage and has been oriented mainly toward determining the magnitude of the governance effect on public good provision, rather than devising tests that would distinguish between alternative theories of dictatorial behavior. While the empirical record is far from unanimous, the weight of evidence indicates that dictatorships under-provide public goods relative to democracies and that the estimated effects are both large in magnitude and statistically significant. JEL Classifications: H1, D72, H11

Suggested Citation

  • Deacon, Robert & Saha, Sarani, 2005. "Public Good Provision by Dictatorships: A Survey," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt1jk5b0vr, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt1jk5b0vr
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Strand, Jon, 2013. "Political economy aspects of fuel subsidies : a conceptual framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6392, The World Bank.
    2. Mare Sarr & Katharina Wick, 2010. "Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 183-205, April.
    3. van Beers, Cees & Strand, Jon, 2013. "Political determinants of fossil fuel pricing," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6470, The World Bank.
    4. repec:pid:journl:v:55:y:2016:i:4:p:657-673 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Saha, Sarani, 2007. "Democratic Institutions and Provision of Public Good," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt55f3c17g, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    6. Allcott, Hunt & Lederman, Daniel & Lopez, Ramon, 2006. "Political institutions, inequality, and agricultural growth : the public expenditure connection," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3902, The World Bank.
    7. Sajjad Faraji Dizaji & Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, 2014. "Political Institutions and Government Spending Behavior in Iran," CESifo Working Paper Series 4620, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Richard T. Carson, 2010. "The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Seeking Empirical Regularity and Theoretical Structure," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 3-23, Winter.
    9. Carson, Richard T, 2009. "Searching for Empirical Regularity and Theoretical Structure: The Environmental Kuznets Curve," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4m6263c2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    10. Hilary Sigman, 2014. "Decentralization and Environmental Quality: An International Analysis of Water Pollution Levels and Variation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(1), pages 114-130.
    11. Robert Deacon, 2009. "Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 241-262, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Good; Provision; Dictatorships;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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