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Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions
[“Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures.”]

Author

Listed:
  • Garance Genicot
  • Laurent Bouton
  • Micael Castanheira

Abstract

This paper studies the political determinants of inequalities in government interventions under majoritarian (MAJ) and proportional representation (PR) systems. We propose a probabilistic voting model of electoral competition with highly targetable government interventions and heterogeneous localities. We uncover a novel relative electoral sensitivity effect that affects government interventions only under MAJ systems. This effect tends to reduce inequality in government interventions under MAJ systems when districts are composed of sufficiently homogeneous localities. This effect goes against the conventional wisdom that MAJ systems are necessarily more conducive to inequality than PR systems. We illustrate the empirical relevance of our results with numerical simulations on possible reforms of the US Electoral College.

Suggested Citation

  • Garance Genicot & Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2021. "Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions [“Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures.”]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3154-3206.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:19:y:2021:i:6:p:3154-3206.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jeea/jvab016
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    Cited by:

    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Dahmani-Scuitti, Anaïs, 2025. "Decentralization in Autocraties," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    2. Matteo Gamalerio & Massimo Morelli & Margherita Negri, 2021. "The Political Economy of Open Borders: Theory and Evidence on the role of Electoral Rules," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21157, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Amy Pond, 2021. "Biased politicians and independent agencies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 279-299, July.
    4. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nunnari, Salvatore, 2019. "The Economic Effects of Electoral Rules: Evidence from Unemployment Benefits," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(3), pages 259-291, July.
    5. Jacopo Bizzotto & Benjamin Solow, 2019. "Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-17, July.
    6. Moya Chin, 2023. "When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 183-209, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General

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