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Democratic Institutions and Provision of Public Good

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  • Saha, Sarani

Abstract

This paper aims to test empirically the predictions of a theory that deals with the effect of different democratic regimes on public good provision. The theory predicts higher provision of public good in proportional electoral systems and parliamentary political regimes in comparison to majoritarian systems and presidential regimes respectively. The tests are performed using cross-country data from the 1990s on health and education quantity indicators of public good. Use of quantity indicators instead of expenditure data, previously used by other researchers, enables a cleaner test of the theory as a higher amount of any quantity measure clearly indicates a higher supply of public good. Overall, the robust results in this paper do not provide enough support for the theory. Electoral system has no effect on any of the public good indicators while except for two indicators under education, the nature of the political regime has no significant effect either.

Suggested Citation

  • Saha, Sarani, 2007. "Democratic Institutions and Provision of Public Good," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt55f3c17g, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt55f3c17g
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    7. Robert T. Deacon & Sarani Saha, 2006. "Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey," Chapters, in: Attiat F. Ott & Richard J. Cebula (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Economics, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lorenzo Cerda Planas, 2014. "Moving to Greener Societies: Moral Motivation and Green Behaviour," Post-Print halshs-01018651, HAL.
    2. Lorenzo Cerda Planas, 2018. "Moving Toward Greener Societies: Moral Motivation and Green Behaviour," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(4), pages 835-860, August.
    3. Lorenzo Cerda Planas, 2014. "Moving to Greener Societies: Moral Motivation and Green Behaviour," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01018651, HAL.
    4. Lorenzo Cerda Planas, 2014. "Moving to Greener Societies: Moral Motivation and Green Behaviour," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14035, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

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