Social rights in the constitution and in practice
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- Hiroaki Matsuura, 2016. "Constitutional social and environmental human rights and child health outcomes in Latin American countries," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-168, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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