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Post‐socialist constitutions: The de jure–de facto gap, its effects and determinantsa

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  • Katarzyna Metelska‐Szaniawska

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on constitutional rules and their economic effects by extending focus to the de jure–de facto constitutional gap. First, evidence is provided that size of this gap matters as higher gaps lower the effectiveness of the constitutional commitment mechanism. Second, several explanations of this gap are identified, in particular relating to the democratization process, political conflict, age and comprehensiveness of the constitution. The conclusions are based on an empirical study for the unique setting of the post‐socialist countries of Europe and Asia, which all enacted new constitutional frameworks after 1989 and it is shown that in some of these countries constitutions acted as blueprints.

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  • Katarzyna Metelska‐Szaniawska, 2021. "Post‐socialist constitutions: The de jure–de facto gap, its effects and determinantsa," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(2), pages 175-196, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:ectrin:v:29:y:2021:i:2:p:175-196
    DOI: 10.1111/ecot.12261
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    1. Voigt, Stefan, 2020. "Mind the Gap – Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality," ILE Working Paper Series 32, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    2. Jacek LEWKOWICZ & Katarzyna METELSKA-SZANIAWSKA, 2021. "De Jure and De Facto Institutions: Implications for Law and for Economics," Ekonomista, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, issue 6, pages 758-776.
    3. Jerg Gutmann & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Stefan Voigt, 2024. "The comparative constitutional compliance database," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 95-115, January.
    4. Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Anna Lewczuk, 2022. "Constitutional overperformance: an empirical study of de facto protection of rights with no de jure equivalents," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 289-317, April.
    5. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2023. "Historical Representative Assembly Experiences and Constitutionalism Today," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 65(4), pages 665-680, December.
    6. Jacek Lewkowicz & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2016. "De jure and de facto institutions – disentangling the interrelationships," Working Papers 2016-29, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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