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De jure and de facto institutions – disentangling the interrelationships

Author

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  • Jacek Lewkowicz

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)

  • Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

    (Faculty of Economi Sciences, University of Warsaw)

Abstract

In this paper we contribute to the debate on the nature of institutions and their economic effects by extending the focus to the de jure – de facto institutional distinction. Firstly, we define and conceptualize de facto institutions, as well as elaborate on their place in the broad institutional system and identification. Then we investigate the possible interrelationships between de facto and de jure institutions. Finally, we make a link between these interrelationships and economic outcomes. In this way the paper fills an underexploited niche in institutional research, which is a major background for law and economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacek Lewkowicz & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2016. "De jure and de facto institutions – disentangling the interrelationships," Working Papers 2016-29, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    • Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2016-29
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    File URL: http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/index.php/download_file/3161/
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    Cited by:

    1. Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Jacek Lewkowicz, 2021. "Post-socialist “illiberal democracies”: do de jure constitutional rights matter?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 233-265, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    new institutional economics; de jure institutions; de facto institutions; formal institutions; informal institutions; institutional interrelationships;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

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