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Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization

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  • Libman, Alexander

Abstract

The paper confronts different aspects of decentralization: fiscal decentralization, post-constitutional regulatory decentralization, and constitutional decentralization – using a single dataset from Russian Federation of the Yeltsin period as a politically asymmetric country. It finds virtually no correlation between different decentralization aspects; moreover, three processes of devolution appearing in the same country at the same time seem to be driven by different (though partly overlapping) forces. Hence, a specific aspect of decentralization is hardly able to serve as a proxy for another one or for the overall decentralization process.

Suggested Citation

  • Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization," MPRA Paper 15854, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15854
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15854/1/MPRA_paper_15854.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Beyna, Ingo & Wystup, Uwe, 2010. "On the calibration of the Cheyette interest rate model," CPQF Working Paper Series 25, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Centre for Practical Quantitative Finance (CPQF).
    2. Veiga, Carlos & Wystup, Uwe, 2010. "Ratings of structured products and issuers' commitments," CPQF Working Paper Series 26, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Centre for Practical Quantitative Finance (CPQF).
    3. Detering, Nils & Weber, Andreas & Wystup, Uwe, 2010. "Return distributions of equity-linked retirement plans," CPQF Working Paper Series 27, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Centre for Practical Quantitative Finance (CPQF).
    4. Libman, A., 2010. "Empirical Research on Determinants of Decentralization: A Literature Survey," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 6, pages 10-29.
    5. Libman, Alexander, 2010. "Internal centralization and international integration in the post-Soviet space," MPRA Paper 21882, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Scholz, Peter & Walther, Ursula, 2010. "Investment certificates under German taxation: Benefit or burden for structured products' performance?," CPQF Working Paper Series 24, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Centre for Practical Quantitative Finance (CPQF).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    constitutions; deregulation; decentralization; fiscal decentralization; administrative decentralization; devolution;

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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