IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Endogenous (De)Centralization and the Russian Federalism

  • Libman, Alexander

    (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Frankfurt/Main, Germany and Moscow, Russia)

Registered author(s):

    The paper provides the econometric study of the factors of distribution of the tax revenue between the levels of government in the Russian Federation based on the framework of the endogenous centralization theory. The first part of the paper considers the distribution of tax revenue between the federal center and the regions based on strategic tax collection; the second part deals with sub-regional aspects of decentralization. The work applies both the traditional econometrics of panel data and Bayesian econometrics.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS" in its journal Applied Econometrics.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 23-57

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:ris:apltrx:0097
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Working Papers 879, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    2. Ben Lockwood, 2004. "Decentralization via Federal and Unitary Referenda," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 79-108, 02.
    3. Bordignon, Massimo & Colombo, Luca & Galmarini, Umberto, 2008. "Fiscal federalism and lobbying," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2288-2301, December.
    4. Freinkman, Lev & Yossifov, Plamen, 1999. "Decentralization in regional fiscal systems in Russia - trends and links to economic performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2100, The World Bank.
    5. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
    6. Jan Schnellenbach & Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2010. "The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 3-26, February.
    7. Warneryd, Karl, 1998. "Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September.
    8. Alexander Libman & Lars P. Feld, 2013. "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(4), pages 449-482, November.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & La Ferrara, Eliana, 2005. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Scholarly Articles 4553005, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    10. Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X., 1996. "Regional cohesion: Evidence and theories of regional growth and convergence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1325-1352, June.
    11. Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberly A., 2004. "The political economy of policy centralization: direct versus representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 799-817, March.
    12. Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," Economics Working Papers 0046, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    13. Elena Jarocinska, 2008. "Are Intergovernmental Grants Tactical? The Evidence from Russia," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0361, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    14. Sven Stö & Christian Traxler, 2005. "Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 515-531, August.
    15. Michela Redoano, 2007. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1968, CESifo Group Munich.
    16. Michele Ruta, 2010. "Lobbying and (de)centralization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 275-291, July.
    17. Freinkman, Lev & Plekhanov, Alexander, 2005. "What determines the extent of fiscal decentralization ? The Russian paradox," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3710, The World Bank.
    18. Arzaghi, Mohammad & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2005. "Why countries are fiscally decentralizing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1157-1189, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:apltrx:0097. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anatoly Peresetsky)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.