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Empirical Research on Determinants of Decentralization: A Literature Survey

  • Libman, A.

    (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Frankfurt/Main, Germany and Moscow, Russia)

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    Empirical research on decentralization plays a crucial role in the modern public economics. This paper surveys the literature, discussing the emergence of positive studies of decentralization as an endogenous parameter, which hence attempt to find out the main factors determining the degree of decentralization in individual countries.

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    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2010-6-10-29r.pdf
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    Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

    Volume (Year): (2010)
    Issue (Month): 6 ()
    Pages: 10-29

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    Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2010:i:6:p:10-29
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    1. repec:mea:ivswpa:532 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Feld, Lars P. & Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Schnellenbach, Jan, 2008. "On government centralization and fiscal referendums," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 611-645, May.
    3. Roland Vaubel, 2009. "Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 203-222, December.
    4. Axel Dreher & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Friedrich Schneider, 2014. "The devil is in the shadow: Do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/132819, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization," MPRA Paper 15854, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Endogenous (De)Centralization and the Russian Federalism," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 9(1), pages 23-57.
    7. Hoxby, Caroline & Baqir, Reza & Alesina, Alberto, 2004. "Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities," Scholarly Articles 4552532, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
    9. Alexander Libman & Lars P. Feld, 2009. "Strategic tax collection and fiscal decentralization: the case of Russia," Working Papers 2009/11, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    10. Axel Dreher & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "The devil is in the shadow: do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official income and official productivity?," DULBEA Working Papers 07-22.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    11. Freinkman, Lev & Plekhanov, Alexander, 2009. "Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 503-512, February.
    12. repec:hrv:faseco:4553034 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Dan Stegarescu, 2005. "Public sector decentralisation: measurement concepts and recent international trends," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 301-333, September.
    14. Koleman S. Strumpf & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 2002. "Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 1-36, February.
    15. Samuel Baker, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 63-79, July.
    16. Cerniglia, Floriana, 2003. "Decentralization in the public sector: quantitative aspects in federal and unitary countries," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 749-776, November.
    17. Mokhtari, Manouchehr & Grafova, Irina, 2007. "Corruption: Theory and evidence from the Russian Federation," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 412-422, December.
    18. Chang, Howard F. & Sigman, Hilary & Traub, Leah G., 2014. "Endogenous decentralization in federal environmental policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 39-50.
    19. Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 587-623, June.
    20. Arzaghi, Mohammad & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2005. "Why countries are fiscally decentralizing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1157-1189, July.
    21. Baker, Samuel H, 2000. " Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 63-79, July.
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