Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?
Previous theoretical and empirical research finds enhanced veto authority has little systematic effect on level of spending. This paper takes a new tact, examining the effect of veto power on the centralization of governmental services. It proposes and tests a model of federalism in which different types of veto authority lead to differing degrees of centralization when the executive and legislature have disparate preferences over the level of government that should provide services. Empirical results indicate governors in the United States use enhanced veto authority to centralize state and local government spending. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 104 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
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