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Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?

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  • Baker, Samuel H

Abstract

Previous theoretical and empirical research finds enhanced veto authority has little systematic effect on level of spending. This paper takes a new tact, examining the effect of veto power on the centralization of governmental services. It proposes and tests a model of federalism in which different types of veto authority lead to differing degrees of centralization when the executive and legislature have disparate preferences over the level of government that should provide services. Empirical results indicate governors in the United States use enhanced veto authority to centralize state and local government spending. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Baker, Samuel H, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 63-79, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:104:y:2000:i:1-2:p:63-79
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    Cited by:

    1. Lars P. Feld & Jan Schnellenbach & Christoph A Schaltegger, 2004. "On Government Centralization and Fiscal Referendums: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Switzerland," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200419, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    2. Feld, Lars P. & Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Schnellenbach, Jan, 2008. "On government centralization and fiscal referendums," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 611-645, May.
    3. Libman, A., 2010. "Empirical Research on Determinants of Decentralization: A Literature Survey," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 6, pages 10-29.
    4. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2001. "On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 615, CESifo.
    5. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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