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The Political Economy of Sustainable Federations

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  • Mark Gradstein

Abstract

This paper studies a constitutional framework that enables sustainable federative agreements. In the model, districts decide on local policies and envision the possibility of entering a federation. Focusing on rules for legislative bargaining in the federation, I find that a non-egalitarian bargaining rule, which assigns policy making power to one of the district's representatives is welfare inferior to the decentralized status quo. In contrast, under an egalitarian bargaining procedure, federation yields a welfare superior outcome. The analysis indicates the desirability of making such egalitarian bargaining rules credible.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Gradstein, 2000. "The Political Economy of Sustainable Federations," CESifo Working Paper Series 315, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_315
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    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo_wp315.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2005. "Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 395-416, March.
    2. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
      [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]
      ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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