Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Analysis
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- Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 2495, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997.
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More about this item
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-1999-04-27 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-1999-04-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-04-27 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-1999-04-27 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IND-1999-04-27 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-1999-04-27 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-1999-04-27 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-1999-04-27 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-1999-04-27 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1999-04-27 (Public Finance)
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