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Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies


  • Mare Sarr


  • Katharina Wick



No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Mare Sarr & Katharina Wick, 2010. "Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 183-205, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:11:y:2010:i:2:p:183-205 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-010-0075-x

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
    2. Wick Katharina, 2008. "Conflict and Production: An Application to Natural Resources," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-47, January.
    3. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, 2013. "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 22(4), pages 570-615, August.
    4. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, January.
    5. César Calderón & Luis Servén, 2004. "The Effects of Infrastructure Development on Growth and Income Distribution," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 270, Central Bank of Chile.
    6. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    7. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-573, October.
    8. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, October.
    9. Robert T. Deacon & Sarani Saha, 2006. "Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey," Chapters,in: The Elgar Companion to Public Economics, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Bulte, Erwin H. & Damania, Richard & Deacon, Robert T., 2005. "Resource intensity, institutions, and development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 1029-1044, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pedrosa-Garcia, Jose Antonio, 2017. "Trends and Features of Research on Foreign Aid: A Literature Review," MPRA Paper 82134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Morten Endrikat, 2017. "Natural resource rents, autocracy and the composition of government spending," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201727, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Cockx, Lara & Francken, Nathalie, 2016. "Natural resources: A curse on education spending?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 394-408.
    4. Cockx, Lara & Francken, Nathalie, 2014. "Extending the concept of the resource curse: Natural resources and public spending on health," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 136-149.
    5. Mundle, Sudipto & Chakraborty, Pinaki & Chowdhury, Samik & Sikdar, Satadru, 2012. "The Quality of Governance: How Have Indian States Performed?," Working Papers 12/104, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    6. Horatiu Rus, 2014. "Corruption, conflict and the management of natural resources," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 355-386, November.

    More about this item


    Resource curse; Public good provision in dictatorships; D74; H41; O13; O50; Q34;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • O50 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - General
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts


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