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Corruption, conflict and the management of natural resources

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  • Horatiu Rus

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Abstract

The documented link between natural resources and civil conflict is not well understood. This paper uses a political economy framework to explore the prevalence of resource-based civil conflict driven by group-level discontent. The theoretical model proposed here offers a policy-based explanation: under conditions related to the quality of governance, discontent about resource management can affect the likelihood of an insurgency. Resource policy arises endogenously as the corrupt government trades-off industry contributions and the cost induced by manifestations of resource-related discontent. The conservation effects of civil unrest are analyzed and government corruption emerges as an important determinant of conflict. The paper also presents some empirical support for the model’s predictions. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Horatiu Rus, 2014. "Corruption, conflict and the management of natural resources," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 355-386, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:15:y:2014:i:4:p:355-386
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-014-0148-3
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict; Quality of governance; Political economy ; Resource management; International trade; H56; Q27; Q56; D74;

    JEL classification:

    • Q27 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Issues in International Trade
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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