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Growth-Friendly Dictatorships

  • Giacomo De Luca

    ()

    (University of York)

  • Anastasia Litina

    ()

    (University of Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance)

  • Petros G. Sekeris

    ()

    (Center for Research in the Economics of Development, University of Namur)

In this paper we show that in highly unequal societies, different societal groups may support a rent-seeking dicator serving their interests better than the median voter in a democratic regime. Importantly, it is the stakes of dictator in the economy, in the form of capital ownership, that drives the support of individuals. In particular, in highly societies ruled by a capital-rich dictator endowed with the power to tax and appropriate at will, the elites support dictatorial policies that generate higher growth rates than the ones obtained under democracy. Such support arises despite the total absence of checks and balances on the dictator.

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File URL: http://www.fundp.ac.be/eco/economie/recherche/wpseries/wp/1209.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Paper provided by University of Namur, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1209.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2012
Date of revision: Sep 2012
Handle: RePEc:nam:wpaper:1209
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