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The political economy of coffee, dictatorship, and genocide

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  • Verwimp, Philip

Abstract

The paper presents a political economy analysis of the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda. The analysis shows how, through the producer price of coffee, the dictator buys political loyalty from the peasant population, and how, in periods of economic growth, the dictator increases his level of personal consumption as well as power over the population. The analysis of Habyarimana’s policy decisions leads to the conclusion that he was a totalitarian type of dictator. When, at the end of the 1980s, the international price of coffee fell dramatically, the regime switched to severe forms of repression to maintain its hold onto power. Genocide emerges as an outcome of Wintrobe’s loyalty-repression model, while foreign aid sustained the dictator’s hold onto power.
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  • Verwimp, Philip, 2003. "The political economy of coffee, dictatorship, and genocide," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 161-181, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:161-181
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    Cited by:

    1. D. de Walque & P. Verwimp, 2010. "The Demographic and Socio-economic Distribution of Excess Mortality during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 19(2), pages 141-162, March.
    2. Leon, Gabriel, 2014. "Strategic redistribution: The political economy of populism in Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 39-51.
    3. Behuria, Pritish, 2017. "The political economy of import substitution in the 21st century: the challenge of recapturing the domestic market in Rwanda," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69470, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. de Walque, Damien, 2004. "The long-term legacy of the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3446, The World Bank.
    5. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Islam and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 185-192, April.
    6. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2020. "Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 161-182, October.
    7. Ana María Ibánez Londono & Juan Carlos Muñoz Mora & Philip Verwimp, 2013. "Abandoning Coffee under the Threat of Violence and the Presence of Illicit Crops. Evidence from Colombia," Documentos CEDE 11465, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    8. Federico Ciani & Gianna C. Giannelli, 2011. "Surviving the genocide: the impact of the Rwandan genocide on child mortality," Working Papers - Economics wp2011_19.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    9. Abel Escribà-Folch, 2009. "Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 71-93, March.
    10. Tony Addison, 2005. "Agricultural Development for Peace," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2005-07, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    11. Adam, Antonis & Tsarsitalidou, Sofia, 2022. "The effect of international development association's (IDA) aid on conflict. A fuzzy regression discontinuity approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    12. Keshab Raj Bhattarai, 2006. "Political Economy of Conflict, Cooperation and Economic Growth: Nepalese Dilemma," EcoMod2006 272100010, EcoMod.
    13. Shanley Pinchotti & Philip Verwimp, 2007. "SOCIAL CAPITAL and the RWANDAN GENOCIDE A Micro-Level Analysis," HiCN Working Papers 30, Households in Conflict Network.
    14. Janus, Thorsten, 2012. "Natural resource extraction and civil conflict," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 24-31.
    15. Bart Capéau & Philip Verwimp, 2012. "Dictatorship in a single export crop economy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 210-234, April.
    16. De Walque Damien & Filmer Deon, 2012. "The Socioeconomic Distribution of Adult Mortality during Conflicts in Africa," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-12, December.
    17. Charles Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2014. "Economics of Genocide and International Law," Working Papers 1409, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    18. Alexandra Bohm, 2013. "Responding to Crises: The Problematic Relationship between Security and Justice in The Responsibility to Protect," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 4(3), pages 247-257, September.
    19. Pritish Behuria, 2018. "The politics of upgrading in global value chains: The case of Rwanda’s coffee sector," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-108-18, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    20. de Walque, Damien, 2005. "Parental education and children's schooling outcomes : is the effect nature, nurture, or both? evidence from recomposed families in Rwanda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3483, The World Bank.
    21. Mitsuru Igami, 2015. "Market Power in International Commodity Trade: The Case of Coffee," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 225-248, June.
    22. Tobias, Jutta M. & Mair, Johanna & Barbosa-Leiker, Celestina, 2013. "Toward a theory of transformative entrepreneuring: Poverty reduction and conflict resolution in Rwanda's entrepreneurial coffee sector," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 728-742.
    23. Anderton Charles H., 2014. "Killing Civilians as an Inferior Input in a Rational Choice Model of Genocide and Mass Killing," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 327-346, April.
    24. McBride, Michael, 2005. "Crises, reforms, and regime persistence in sub-Saharan Africa," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 688-707, September.
    25. repec:bpj:pepspp:v:18:y:2012:i:3:p:12:n:15 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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