Civil Wars and International Trade
This article analyzes empirically the relationship between civil wars and international trade. We first show that trade destruction due to civil wars is very large and persistent and increases with the severity of the conflict. We then identify two effects that trade can have on the risk of civil conflicts: It may act as a deterrent if trade gains are put at risk during civil wars, but it may also act as an insurance if international trade provides a substitute to internal trade during civil wars. We find support for the presence of these two mechanisms and conclude that trade openness may deter the most severe civil wars (those that destroy the largest amount of trade) but may increase the risk of lower-scale conflicts. (JEL: F10, F51, F52, F59) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 6 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04-05)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess, 2004.
"How Much Does Violence Tax Trade?,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1222, CESifo Group Munich.
- Paul Collier & Dominic Rohner, 2008. "Democracy, Development, and Conflict," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 531-540, 04-05.
- Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler & Dominic Rohner, 2006.
"Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,"
Economics Series Working Papers
WPS/2006-10, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler & Dominic Rohner, 2009. "Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(1), pages 1-27, January.
- Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler & Dominic Rohner, 2006. "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War," CSAE Working Paper Series 2006-10, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Mathias Thoenig, 2008.
"Make Trade not War?,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- James D. Fearon, 2005. "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(4), pages 483-507, August.
- James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2004.
NBER Working Papers
10480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baier, Scott L. & Bergstrand, Jeffrey H., 2004. "Economic determinants of free trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 29-63, October.
- John Romalis, 2007.
"NAFTA's and CUSFTA's Impact on International Trade,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 416-435, August.
- John Romalis, 2005. "NAFTA's and CUSFTA's Impact on International Trade," NBER Working Papers 11059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:2-3:p:541-550. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kristin Waites)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.