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Coup d’état and a democratic signal: The connection between protests and coups after the Cold War

Author

Listed:
  • Taku Yukawa

    (Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo)

  • Kaoru Hidaka

    (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba)

  • Kaori Kushima

    (Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo)

  • Masafumi Fujita

    (Center for Pacific and American Studies, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

What connection exists between protests and coup attempts? Although recent studies have revealed that the former incites the latter, they generally do not consider international factors. We contend that post-Cold War nonviolent protests have promoted coup attempts. With sentiment in the international community turning against coups following the end of the Cold War, coup organizers have had to portray their actions as democratic. Launching a coup attempt during ongoing nonviolent protests became a convincing method to prove democratic bona fides. This is because the international community favors nonviolence, and it signals that the emerging regime will not have extreme preferences and will keep order. Conversely, the international community does not regard violent protests as legitimate, and staging a coup attempt during violent protests will not enable a military to claim legitimacy. This argument is tested through statistical analysis and by using the 2011 Egyptian coup as a case study. As expected, the results indicate that the impact of protests on coup attempts varies depending on (1) whether those protests are violent or nonviolent, and on (2) the period. Specifically, only the nonviolent protests in the post-Cold War era prompt coup attempts meaningfully.

Suggested Citation

  • Taku Yukawa & Kaoru Hidaka & Kaori Kushima & Masafumi Fujita, 2022. "Coup d’état and a democratic signal: The connection between protests and coups after the Cold War," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(6), pages 828-843, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:59:y:2022:i:6:p:828-843
    DOI: 10.1177/00223433211053187
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