IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/trr/wpaper/202506.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

International Sanctions and Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Jerg Gutmann
  • Pascal Langer
  • Matthias Neuenkirch

Abstract

A major concern about the imposition of international sanctions is that they may permanently deteriorate the quality of institutions in target countries, potentially causing an increase in corruption. While case studies suggest that this is frequently the case, systematic evidence is so far missing. We provide the first cross-country statistical analysis of the impact of sanctions on public-sector corruption. Using a panel difference-in-differences model and an event study approach, we analyze sanctions against 125 countries from 1971 to 2019. Our results show that Western (and UN) sanctions cause a significant decline of corruption in democracies, while non-Western sanctions and those targeting autocracies have no systematic impact. Event study estimates time the reductions in corruption at about three to four years into the sanctions episode. They persist throughout the sanctions period, but once sanctions are lifted, corruption levels revert to their pre-treatment baseline, indicating that the corruption-reducing effect is limited to the duration of the sanctions episode. Further analysis reveals that the effect is stronger when sanctions explicitly target democratization or human rights improvements.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerg Gutmann & Pascal Langer & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2024. "International Sanctions and Corruption," Research Papers in Economics 2025-06, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:trr:wpaper:202506
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/fb4/prof/VWL/EWF/Research_Papers/2025-06.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2025
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trr:wpaper:202506. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Matthias Neuenkirch (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/petride.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.