IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nys/sunysb/10-02.html

The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Sandro Brusco

    (Department of Economics, Stony Brook University)

  • Marcin Dziubinski

    (Institute of Informatics, Faculty of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, Warsaw University, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warsaw, Poland.)

  • Jaideep Roy

    (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK.)

Abstract

We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n >= 2 oce seeking candidates and runo voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of voters' ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize. In this sense, our analysis suggests that two-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandro Brusco & Marcin Dziubinski & Jaideep Roy, 2010. "The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting," Department of Economics Working Papers 10-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:10-02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.stonybrook.edu/economics/research/papers/2010/BDR20100901-1.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2010
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2016. "Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 76-102.
    3. Ruben Durante & Emilio Gutierrez, 2014. "Political Advertising and Voting Intention: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Ads Viewership," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/26lctatf2u8, Sciences Po.
    4. Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2018. "Electoral competition with third party entry in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 121-134.
    5. Ružica Savčić & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Apostolic voting," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 1400-1417, November.
    6. Rahul Swamy & Timothy Murray, 0. "Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-29.
    7. Windsor, Duane, 2013. "Corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility: A positive theory approach," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(10), pages 1937-1944.
    8. Sophie Bade, 2011. "Divergent Platforms," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2011_25, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    9. David Ronayne, 2018. "Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 389-403, September.
    10. Giat, Yahel, 2019. "A location model for boycotting with an application to kosher certification," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 273(3), pages 1109-1118.
    11. Sophie Bade, 2016. "Divergent platforms," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(4), pages 561-580, April.
    12. Ruben Durante & Emilio Gutierrez, 2014. "Political Advertising and Voting Intention: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Ads Viewership," Working Papers hal-03460274, HAL.
    13. Buisseret, Peter, 2017. "Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 494-506.
    14. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 21-54, Springer.
    15. Rahul Swamy & Timothy Murray, 2022. "Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 2056-2084, October.
    16. Damien Bol & André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2015. "Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality and Majority Runoff," PSE Working Papers halshs-01168722, HAL.
    17. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2014. "Mixed equilibria in runoff elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 619-623.
    18. Joshua Holzer, 2019. "Reevaluating the presidential runoff rule: Does a provision promote the protection of human rights?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(5), pages 1-11, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:10-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edstous.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.