Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Osborne Martin J., 1993.
"Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January.
- Martin J. Osborne, 1992. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 1992-02, McMaster University.
- Fey, Mark, 2012. "Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 424-427.
- Haan, Marco & Volkerink, Bjorn, 2001.
"A runoff system restores the principle of minimum differentiation,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 157-162, March.
- Haan, Marco & Volkerink, BjÃ¸rn, 1999. "A runoff system restores the principle of minimum differentiation," Research Report 99C22, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Brusco, Sandro & Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep, 2012. "The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 447-469.
- Shaked, A, 1982. "Existence and Computation of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for 3-Firms Location Problem," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1-2), pages 93-96, September.
- Matsushima, Noriaki, 2007. "Uncertainty of voters' preferences and differentiation in a runoff system," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1185-1189, December.
- Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 223-237, February.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2016.
"Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 76-102.
- Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2015, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Ewerhart Christian, 2015. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Pure Location Game: The Case of n≥4$$n \ge 4$$ Firms," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 457-472, July.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of n ≥ 4 firms," ECON - Working Papers 168, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
More about this item
KeywordsRunoff voting; Mixed strategies; Hotelling–Downs;
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:619-623. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.