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The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: On clustering in the four-player hotelling game

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  • Huck, Steffen
  • Müller, Wieland
  • Vriend, Nicolaas J.

Abstract

This article investigates whether decision makers intuitively optimize close to the normative prediction in entrepreneurial decision situations where their time must be allocated between a wage job and a newly formed venture. We offer an analytical model based on maximizing expected utility, and derive an optimal time allocation strategy for decreasing, constant and increasing returns from time invested in the venture. The model's predictions are tested in a simple questionnaire experiment where respondents have to detect corner solutions, that is, they should allocate to the venture either the maximum or the minimum possible time. Respondents are found to allocate time relatively close to the normative predictions, although with systematic deviations that are consistent with well-known decision anomalies. Risk propensity is found to have an impact on the decisions, but it should not according to the model. Respondents appear to use an anchoring and adjustment procedure and are influenced by the so-called affect heuristic, which may explain why those who do not mathematically optimize have their decision partially driven by their risk propensity. Implications of our findings for entrepreneurs and institutions dealing with entrepreneurs are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2000. "The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: On clustering in the four-player hotelling game," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,24, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200024
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    Cited by:

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    2. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Tanimura, Emily & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2019. "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation revisited: Return of the median voter," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 145-170.
    3. Aurélie Bonein & Stéphane Turolla, 2023. "Spatial competition with demand uncertainty: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(4), pages 906-939, October.
    4. David J. Butler, 2005. "A Reality Check for Game Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 137-147, February.
    5. Orzen, Henrik & Sefton, Martin, 2008. "An experiment on spatial price competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 716-729, May.
    6. Gaëtan Fournier & Marco Scarsini, 2014. "Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria," Post-Print halshs-00983085, HAL.
    7. Dimitrios Xefteris & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzis, 2018. "Catalog Competition: Equilibrium Characterization and experimental evidence," Working Papers 2018/08, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    8. Lisa R. Anderson & Beth A. Freeborn & Jessica Holmes & Mark Jeffreys & Dan Lass & Jack Soper, 2006. "Location, Location, Location! A Classroom Demonstration of the Hotelling Model," Working Papers 44, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, revised 05 Feb 2007.
    9. Wilfred Amaldoss & Woochoel Shin, 2011. "Competing for Low-End Markets," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(5), pages 776-788, September.
    10. Curtis Kephart & Daniel Friedman, 2015. "Hotelling revisits the lab: equilibration in continuous and discrete time," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(2), pages 132-145, December.
    11. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
    12. Aurélien Nioche & Basile Garcia & Thomas Boraud & Nicolas Rougier & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, 2019. "Interaction effects between consumer information and firms' decision rules in a duopoly: how cognitive features can impact market dynamics," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 5(1), pages 1-11, December.
    13. Dimitrios Xefteris & Iván Barreda‐Tarrazona & Aurora García‐Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís, 2023. "Catalog competition: Theory and experimental evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(1), pages 122-137, January.
    14. Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Andaluz-Funcia, Joaquín & Gil-Sanz, Agustín, 2011. "An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 74-83, January.
    15. Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Sabater-Grande, Gerardo, 2005. "Buyer-seller interaction in experimental spatial markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 89-108, March.
    16. Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of n ≥ 4 firms," ECON - Working Papers 168, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    17. Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decision Making; Intuitive Optimizing; Micro Economics Model; Time Allocation Strategy; Entrepreneurship; Questionnaire Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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