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Hotelling revisits the lab: equilibration in continuous and discrete time

Author

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  • Curtis Kephart

    (University of California, Santa Cruz)

  • Daniel Friedman

    (University of California, Santa Cruz)

Abstract

We investigate experimentally the impact of continuous time on a four-player Hotelling location game. The static pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) consists of firms paired-up at the first and third quartiles of the linear city. In a repeated simultaneous move (discrete time) treatment, we largely replicate previous findings in which subjects fail to converge to the NE. However, in asynchronous move (continuous time) treatments we see clear convergence towards the NE.

Suggested Citation

  • Curtis Kephart & Daniel Friedman, 2015. "Hotelling revisits the lab: equilibration in continuous and discrete time," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(2), pages 132-145, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:1:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40881-015-0009-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s40881-015-0009-z
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    Cited by:

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    2. Zhao, Shuchen, 2021. "Taking turns in continuous time," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 257-279.
    3. Tasneem, Dina & Engle-Warnick, Jim & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2017. "An experimental study of a common property renewable resource game in continuous time," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 91-119.
    4. Matthew Embrey & Christian Seel & J. Philipp Reiss, 2020. "Gambling in Risk-Taking Contests: Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series 1620, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    5. repec:sus:susewp:0623 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2023. "Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 50-72.
    7. Aurélien Nioche & Basile Garcia & Thomas Boraud & Nicolas Rougier & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, 2019. "Interaction effects between consumer information and firms' decision rules in a duopoly: how cognitive features can impact market dynamics," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 5(1), pages 1-11, December.
    8. Dimitrios Xefteris & Iván Barreda‐Tarrazona & Aurora García‐Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís, 2023. "Catalog competition: Theory and experimental evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(1), pages 122-137, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hotelling model; Laboratory experiment; Asynchronous move;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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